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Abstract. Blockchains are a new digital technology that combines peer-to-peer10
network computing and cryptography to create an immutable decentralised public11
ledger. Where the ledger records money, a blockchain is a cryptocurrency, such as12
Bitcoin; but ledger entries can record any data structure, including property titles,13
identity and certification, contracts, and so on. We argue that the economics of14
blockchains extend beyond analysis of a new general purpose technology and its15
disruptive Schumpeterian consequences to the broader idea that blockchains are16
an institutional technology. We consider several examples of blockchain-based17
economic coordination and governance. We claim that blockchains are an18
instance of institutional evolution.19
1. Introduction20
Blockchains were invented anonymously and released publicly (under the alias21
Satoshi Nakamoto: see Nakamoto 2008) as the technology underpinning Bitcoin,22
a cryptocurrency. Blockchain was the technology that enabled Bitcoin finally23
to resolve the double-spending problem that hitherto bedevilled all previous24
attempts to create a digital currency, and thus to emerge as the first native25
internet-based currency (Evans 2014; Narayan et al. 2016).1 A blockchain is a Q226
way to combine peer-to-peer networks, such as the internet, with cryptography27
(public key messaging and hash functions) to create an immutable time-stamped28
public ledger (Swan 2015; Pilkington 2016). The technological novelty of a29
blockchain is that can create consensus about the true state of a ledger (which30
might, for instance, record exchanges, contracts, ownership, identity or data)31
∗Email: jason.potts@rmit.edu.au
1 As a specific technology for digital cryptocurrencies, a blockchain (e.g. the Bitcoin blockchain)
is a technical solution to the double-spending problem (the ‘Byzantine General’s problem’) using a
decentralised database with network-enforced processes based on a proof-of-work consensus mechanism
for updating the database.
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without needing to trust any centralised or intermediating party – such as an32
auditor, a corporation, a market exchange or a government – and is in this sense33
referred to as ‘distributed ledger technology’ or a ‘trustless consensus engine’34
(Swanson 2014, original emphasis).35
Cryptocurrencies have certainly attracted the attention of economists (Böhme36
et al. 2015), particularly those concerned with digital money payments platforms37
(Mills et al. 2016; White 2015). Cryptocurrencies and blockchains together, in38
the past several years, have notably entered the hype-cycle of media, business39
and government attention (Tapscott and Tapscott 2016; Walport 2016). We40
argue that blockchains are the true innovation here, and however valuable41
cryptocurrencies do (or do not) turn out to be, they are simply the first42
instantiation of the technology. An economic analysis of blockchains should43
therefore proceed in terms of not only money on the blockchain, but also44
of all other possible data structures that could be on the blockchain as well.45
The problem with an economic analysis of blockchains qua cryptocurrencies is46
that the underlying technology is entirely separate from money and payments,47
which were just the problem domain in which it first emerged. Blockchains48
are understood better from an economic perspective as a public database or49
ledger technology, and ledgers are significant because they are a foundational50
institutional technology of market capitalism. This paper proposes a new way51
of understanding the economic significance of blockchains from the perspective52
that they are a new institutional technology.53
Analysing the economic effect of blockchains as a new technology focuses54
attention on the question: What type of technology is this? There have been55
two broad categories of answer. The first is that blockchain is a general purpose56
technology, meaning that it is expected to have broad transformative application57
across many sectors of the economy and contribute to multifactor productivity58
growth (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995; Lipsey et al. 2005).2 This perspective,59
whether stated implicitly or explicitly, underpins the case for hype surrounding60
the prospects of blockchain technology as an ‘engine of growth’. A second per-61
spective places a different emphasis on the way in which the arrival of blockchain62
technology might impact the economy by viewing it through a Coasian, rather63
than a Schumpeterian, lens. Along this line, Catalini and Gans (2016) portray64
the ‘simple economics of blockchain’ as the analysis of a new technology that65
lowers transaction costs through costless verification and without the need for66
costly intermediation, which they suggest will improve the efficiency and scope67
of markets, moving them closer to a direct peer-to-peer ideal. This distinction68
comes down to whether the blockchain is understood to contribute to production69
technology (the general purpose technology view) or to exchange technology (the70
market-enhancing view). Our argument is that the blockchain – or distributed71
2 Other recent examples of GPTs are, for instance, 3D printing, smart robots and machine learning,
artificial intelligence, virtual reality, nanomaterials and gene editing.
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ledger technology – is neither a production nor an exchange technology per se,72
although this is largely how it has been portrayed, but is better understood from73
the economic perspective as an institutional technology.74
Why does this distinction matter? Surely with the flood of start-up companies75
doing ‘X, but on the blockchain’, and as X ranges across an ever wider range76
of applications and sectors, a case can be made that blockchains are indeed a77
general purpose technology that will improve the productive efficiency of some78
economic operations. Furthermore, irrespective of the extent of hype (high), or79
levels of adoption (growing, but still very low), or the actual speed and cost of80
each transaction (for instance, with the current blocksize constraints and without81
the use of sidechains, Bitcoin is still orders of magnitude slower and more costly82
than global payment platforms such as Mastercard/Visa or Paypal), blockchain83
is plainly a technology that will lower the transaction costs of some exchanges.84
Those who take a long position on blockchain technology are in effect arguing85
that it will improve the efficiency of economic systems by disintermediating86
many current patterns of exchange and production, thus improving economic87
efficiency. They see this as disruptive, in the Schumpeterian sense, because it88
disturbs the existing economic rents that can be controlled and captured by large89
intermediaries providing centralised trust, whether corporate or government.90
Our claim that the significance of blockchain as an institutional technology91
amounts to the idea that blockchain is actually a new way of coordinating92
economic activity. That is, this technology is actually a new type of economic93
institution. This is different from the production or exchange efficiency perspec-94
tives, which are in effect arguing that it offers margins of improvement to existing95
economic institutions by raising multifactor productivity or lowering transaction96
costs. Put bluntly, our argument is that until 2009, the economic institutions of97
capitalism consisted – in the conjoint schemas of Hayek, Williamson, Buchanan,98
North and Ostrom – of firms, markets, commons, clubs, relational contracts99
and governments, and that these institutions collectively furnished money, law,100
property rights, contracts and finance through organisations and networks of101
production and exchange (Hodgson 2015). But since 2009, there has been an102
additional mechanism for groups of people to coordinate their economic activity,103
i.e. through the institutional mechanism of a blockchain.104
We do not claim to know whether the technological development and105
adoption of blockchains will increase market efficiency (cf. Catalini and Gans106
2016) or improve productivity in firms and governments (cf. Böhme et al. 2015;107
Walport 2016). It is unclear at this early stage whether any of the current hype108
surrounding blockchain is justified. Rather, we argue that blockchain ought to109
be of special interest to institutional economists because it appears to offer a110
new way of coordinating economic activity owing to the underlying technology111
possessing many institutional aspects of market capitalism itself: viz. property112
rights (ledger entry and private keys), exchange mechanisms (public keys and113
peer-to-peer networks) (native money (crypto-tokens), law (code) and finance114
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(initial coin offerings). The argument of this paper is that blockchains are actually115
an institutional technology, and should be analysed from this perspective.116
Section 2 reviews blockchain technology and how it works. Section 3117
distinguishes between technological and institutional innovations and argues that118
distributed ledger technology is best understood as an institutional innovation119
(i.e. a governance technology). Section 4 places our argument in the context of120
the evolving institutions of capitalism.121
2. The institutional technology of ledgers and the crypto-technology of122
blockchains123
Blockchain is the technology that underpins Bitcoin, the first successful124
cryptocurrency. The breakthrough was the creation of a distributed ledger, such125
that each node in the network has a copy of the ledger, and there is a mechanism126
– a cryptographically secure and crypto-economically incentivised mechanism –127
to ensure consensus about the true state of the ledger without the need to trust128
a centralised node or authority.129
A ledger is an ancient accounting technology to record (i.e. maintain consensus130
about) who (or what) owns what, of who (or what) has agreed to what, of131
what counts as a what, and to record when anything of value is transacted.132
As the fundamental instruments of transactional legitimation, ledgers are an133
elemental technology of modern market capitalism and statecraft (Allen 2011;134
Nussbaum 1933; Yamey 1949). So a significant shift in ledger technology –135
from a centralised method of producing consensus in the ledger (using trust) to a136
distributed approach to consensus (using the blockchain) – could transform the137
transactional mechanics of a modern economy.138
The basic qualities a ledger possesses are clarity (i.e. legibility), consistency139
and consensus as a factual and agreed-upon recording of the basic datum of140
an economy: of identity, property, contract and value, and usually recording141
time and sometimes location. A ledger is basically a recording of the state142
of an economy, and changes in the ledger register changes in the economy143
in consequence of economic actions and transactions. But the other quality a144
ledger must possess is that it is trusted. A well-trusted ledger creates a low145
transaction cost economy, a precondition for economic efficiency and prosperity146
(Nooteboom 2002; North 1990). Trust is highest when the ledger is centralised147
and strong, and so ledgers for property titling, contracts, money and suchlike148
have long cemented government at the centre of modern capitalism. The need for149
high-quality trusted ledgers is, in this sense, the same expression of the need for150
high-quality central government institutions (non-corrupt, efficient) and large151
centralised aggregating organisations. But large central governments and large152
aggregator corporations come at a cost, both in overhead processes associated153
with statecraft (Scott 1998), and in distorted incentives (the subject of public154
choice economics). Manufacturing trust is necessary, but often expensive.155
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The technology of blockchain combines mathematical cryptography, open-156
source software, computer networks and incentive mechanisms. A blockchain157
is a cryptographically secured and crypto-economically incentivised class of dis-158
tributed ledger – in plain language, a decentralised database. By having a public159
distributed ledger the blockchain substitutes public verification and consensus for160
auditing by a trusted third party. Many of the technical specifics need not concern161
us here, details of which can be found in Buterin (2014b), Nakamoto (2008),162
Pilkington (2016), Swan (2015), Swanson (2014) and Wood (2014c). But three163
aspects of how they work are instrumental to our perspective of blockchains as164
a new institutional technology: first, a blockchain is a database that produces165
trustless consensus; second, blockchains operate on the internet, and so the possi-166
bilities of economic coordination are limited by the extent of the blockchain; and167
third, blockchains are a database, and anything digital can exist on a blockchain.168
Blockchains are consensus engines169
A ledger is a way of producing consensus about the facts that are necessary for170
commerce to function. Moreover, the institutional and organisational outline of171
a modern economy is a consequence of those ledgers needing to be centralised (i.e.172
in government, in layers of bureaucracy, in large corporations). A blockchain173
is a new approach to building and using ledgers, i.e. to producing consensus.174
The new part is to have figured out a way to use distributed ledgers (as175
opposed to centralised ledgers) securely and effectively and thus to produce176
consensus without requiring centralised trust, overturning the old technology177
of ledgers that needed to be centralised in order to be trusted. A blockchain178
is a ‘trustless’ distributed ledger. Cryptographically secured blockchains are179
said to be ‘trustless’ because they do not require third-party verification (i.e.180
trust), but instead use high-powered crypto-economic3 incentive protocols to181
verify the authenticity of a transaction in the database (i.e. to reach consensus).182
This is how blockchains can disintermediate a transaction (a consequence of183
which is lowered transaction costs), resulting in new forms of organisation184
and governance. Examples are the ‘distributed autonomous organisations’185
(DAOs) and ‘initial coin offerings’ (ICOs) that disintermediate the allocation186
of venture capital;4 ‘Steem’ disintermediating user-generated content production187
and rewards (Larimer et al. 2016); and ‘Backfeed’5 disintermediating open188
3 ‘Crypto-economic’ refers to any decentralised cryptographic protocol that ‘uses economic incentives
to ensure that it keeps going and doesn’t go back in time or incur any other glitch’ (Buterin 2015). The
proof-of-work Bitcoin mining protocols are crypto-economic in this sense.
4 The DAO (http:/daohub.org/) is a crowd-sourced investment fund running on the Ethereum
blockchain. It is an example of a DAO (Decentralised Autonomous Organisation). ‘A DAO is effectively
a community, with its resources organised according torules agreed in advance and set out in its code’
(Allen and Overy 2016: 3).
5 ‘Backfeed’ is a protocol for building decentralised organisations, or distributed governance
systems, through a proof-of-value consensus mechanism. It runs on the Ethereum blockchain. See
http://backfeed.cc/.
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source collaboration. In each case, blockchain provides the ‘technology stack’189
to coordinate the economic actions of an emergent community without the need190
for a trusted (third-party, centralised, intermediating) coordinator.191
By contrast, centralised ledger technologies, as deployed by governments192
and large corporations, are trust-based technologies because their functioning193
is conditional upon trust in their legitimacy and accuracy. The problem is194
that trust, and the high-quality institutions required to support it, can be195
expensive to manufacture conventionally. Klein (1997) contains several case196
studies demonstrating how trust is necessary to facilitate trade – yet establishing197
that trust can be very expensive, often involving large, visible and irreversible198
investments (De Long 1991; Klein and Leffler 1981). In the case of third-party199
enforcement via the nation state, this requires a monopoly on coercive powers200
(Olson 1993), and an implicit promise (a social contract) not to abuse that201
power. In consequence, enormous rents are locked up behind these centralised202
monopolies of trust. Trustless technologies are thus an important step in203
unlocking and releasing that value and in overcoming the hazards involved204
in manufacturing trust. By removing the need for powerful central third-party205
validation, verification and enforcement mechanisms, cryptographically secured206
blockchain technologies are in principle safe transaction environments, even in207
the presence of powerful or hostile third parties trying to prevent users from208
participating, and they achieve this with high transparency as well as furnishing209
scope for exit, when irreconcilable disagreements arise, through a ‘fork’ in the210
code.6211
Blockchains are limited by the extent of the internet212
Blockchains are ledgers (or databases) and anything that can be coded into a213
ledger can be recorded on a blockchain. The most obvious data are numbers214
recording units of account. But strings of numbers can be used to represent215
identities, or programs, and in this way ledgers can become units of computation.216
Blockchain protocols are mechanisms to arrive at consensus about which217
numbers or programs are the true and agreed-upon ones, and once time-stamped218
these enter as a block into a continuous chain, linked to all previous blocks (hence219
block-chain) all the way back to the genesis transaction.220
Blockchains are a technology that operates on the internet, i.e. on networks221
of computers. In the same way the internet was the next generation beyond222
(unlinked) computers, blockchains are claimed to be the next generation beyond223
the internet. What blockchains bring to the internet are public ledger protocols.224
What this does, in effect, is to turn the internet into a ‘public computer’, or a225
‘world computer’ (Wood 2014c). This was not initially obvious in the seminal226
6 ‘Forking’ is a term of art in software engineering when a copy of the source code is made to start (i.e.
fork) a new line of development. In open source software, forking does not require developer permission.
See https://bitcoin.org/en/glossary/hard-fork (accessed 30 April 2017).
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version of blockchain, built to solve a specific problem – but by adding a general227
scripting language with programmable functionality blockchains can become a228
platform for creating ‘smart ledgers’ (Swanson 2014).229
An example of a smart ledger is Ethereum (Buterin 2014b, De Filippi230
and Mauro 2014). If Bitcoin can be described as a specialised technology,231
a cryptographically secure transaction-based state machine, then Ethereum232
attempts to build the generalised technology (a virtual machine) on which233
all transaction-based state machine concepts may be built. It is a platform234
for zero-trust computing (Wood 2014c). The generalised Ethereum blockchain235
technology is the Turing-complete scripting language and protocols for building236
decentralised applications that run on the Ethereum blockchain using its own237
native cryptocurrency (Ether). In Ethereum agents can write and execute238
smart contracts (a self-executing digital contract), from which can be created239
decentralised applications including Distributed Autonomous Organisations240
(DAOs).7 Smart contracts and DAOs enable the internet of things (IoT), which241
must ultimately require a decentralised register because its scale will vastly exceed242
any possible centralised ledger.243
Blockchains enable the basic technology of a public ledger to evolve into a244
public computer for economic coordination. Vitalik Buterin (2015), co-founder245
of Ethereum, provides this definition of blockchains:246
A blockchain can upload programs and leave the programs to self-execute,247
where the current and all previous states of every program are always publically248
visible, and which carries a very strong cryptoeconomically secured guarantee249
that programs running on the chain will continue to execute in exactly the way250
that the blockchain protocol specifies. . . . Blockchains are not about bringing251
to the world any one particular ruleset, they’re about creating the freedom to252
create a new mechanism with a new ruleset extremely quickly and pushing it253
out. They’re Lego Mindstorms for building economic and social institutions.254
Blockchains are platforms for building bespoke economic coordination using255
distributed ledgers augmented with computationally embedded features such256
as programmable money (cryptocurrencies), programmable contracts (i.e. smart257
contracts) and organisations made of software (DAOs). These are building blocks258
of new forms of economic governance. This is the sense in which blockchains259
are an institutional technology.260
Blockchains are digital databases261
Third, blockchains are a generalised economic institution in the same way a262
market is. Just as we can identify a market mechanism without specifying263
what is actually exchanged in that market, this is also true of a blockchain.264
Anything configurable or able to be represented in a digital database can be265
7 Buterin (2014a), Wood (2014a, 2014b).
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on a blockchain. Blockchains are of course a very new technology – viz. the266
Bitcoin blockchain has been operating continuously since 2009 and the Ethereum267
blockchain only since 2015 – and so beyond the initial proof of concept by268
putting money on the blockchain (i.e. cryptocurrencies),8 much entrepreneurial269
attention being paid to the technology is focused on testing experimentally what270
else can be put on the blockchain, and the associated costs and benefits of271
that action (Allen 2016; De Filippi 2015). The number of blockchain start-272
up companies and the amount of venture capital invested has grown rapidly273
recently,9 ranging across a large domain of applications including: identity,274
property and asset titles, financial securities, intellectual property, insurance,275
IoT, certification, health records, smart contracts, prediction markets, gambling,276
notaries, logistics platforms, provenance, wallets, social networks, and media277
and open science, among others.278
3. What sort of technology is blockchain?279
It is said that blockchains are a new general purpose technology (Pilkington280
2016), of the same class of technological trajectories as, for instance, electricity,281
transistors, computers, the internet, mobile phones and so on (Perez 2009).282
Popular articles on blockchains often represent the technology as the next283
generation of the internet, or as the ‘internet of value’ (e.g. Swan 2015; Tapscott284
and Tapscott 2016). Such tropes are intended to foreshadow blockchains as285
being similarly large, disruptive and widespread as comparable to computers286
or the internet. Yet an economic analysis of blockchain technology needs to287
consider carefully just what sort of technology it really is. If blockchains are288
a general purpose technology, then their significance is in being next in a289
line of transformative information technologies, each powering a productivity290
revolution: e.g. transistors, computers, the internet and now blockchains. If so,291
then what matters is the estimate of the productivity dividend they might bring292
(i.e. whether it is large or small and how it is distributed). But if blockchains293
are better understood as a new institutional technology, then what we have is294
the arrival of a new species of economic coordination – à la Williamson (1985)295
and North (1990) – firms, markets, relational contracting and now blockchains.296
If this is the case, then what matters is what economic activities will shift to297
this mode of coordination, which is to say that the interesting question is the298
reorganisation of the institutional boundaries of economic coordination.299
We can thus examine the economics of blockchain technology through a300
Schumpeterian lens of the productivity consequences of adopting and diffusing301
8 See https://coinmarketcap.com/ for a listing of prices and trade volumes. As of April 2017, the
market cap of all cryptocurrencies was about $USD 23 billion.
9 AngelList (https://angel.co/blockchains) lists over 500 blockchain start-ups, with an average
valuation at $USD 4 million, as at March 2017.
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a new information and communications technology, or through an institutional302
lens of efficient governance. A general purpose technology (GPT)-focused303
analysis will emphasise the gains in total factor productivity (TFP) to existing304
economic operations, as well as its creative-destructive effect on firms, markets,305
industries and jobs. But an institutionally focused analysis of blockchains as a306
new coordination technology focuses on a different aspect, viz. how blockchains307
compete with firms, markets and economies as institutional alternatives for308
coordinating the economic actions of groups of people.309
Two sorts of technology310
Blockchain is a new technology, and the invention, adoption and use of this311
new technology can be examined using economic theory. But there are two312
distinct (yet commensurable) approaches to the meaning of technological change:313
the neoclassical approach, and the institutional or evolutionary approach. In314
the neoclassical production-function model, technological change is a change315
in factor productivity. In the institutional/evolutionary approach, technologies316
also include ‘social technologies’, or institutions and organisations, as rules for317
coordinating people, and so institutional change is also a type of technological318
change (Nelson and Sampat 2001). In the social technology approach,319
technological change is a change in institutional efficiency.320
In the neoclassical model, blockchain technology is factor augmenting.321
Its adoption drives economic growth by improving efficiencies, or reducing322
inefficiencies, using a superior technology to achieve a particular task, e.g. as323
a payments system or asset transfer register (Catalini and Tucker 2016). People324
adopt the new technology because of these marginal productive efficiency gains.325
Technological change makes one or more input factors more productive (i.e.326
it is factor augmenting) and so the aggregate measure of technological change327
is TFP. TFP is equivalently a measure of economic growth and real income328
because the rewards of increased factor productivity accrue to the owners of those329
factors. Technological change in any general purpose technology (say electricity,330
computers or blockchains) is factor augmenting. The benefit of adopting331
electricity or computers does not accrue just to the owners of those technologies,332
but under competition accrues to all factors that use those technologies, because333
their marginal productivity (and therefore marginal revenue product) has been334
enhanced. Blockchain innovations increase TFP by reducing the production costs335
associated with any endeavour to produce a particular output. An example is336
private or permissioned blockchains that reduce the cost of doing a particular337
thing (such as reconciliation, or international money transfers). Here blockchain338
technology reduces a production cost by eliminating an intermediate cost or339
lowering the cost of a process, such as verification (Catalini and Gans 2016).340
We can model blockchain as a productivity-enhancing technological change by341
treating it as the latest in a long line of general-purpose technologies. And while342
the specifics of the size of the aggregate effect and the form of the distributional343
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gains and losses are ex ante unknowable, as are the shape of the entrepreneurial344
opportunities and also forms of consumer surplus, what can be inferred is that345
the new technology will contribute to economic growth and prosperity because,346
by making existing factors more productive, it ‘economises’ on scarce resources.347
But there is another way that economising can occur, which is by economising348
not on production costs, but on transaction costs. This idea was elucidated by349
Ronald Coase (1937, 1960) to explain the existence of the firm and the existence350
of the law. The basic insight of new institutional economics was asking why some351
transactions occur in firms (hierarchies) rather than in markets? The answer was352
that because of transaction costs in dealing with uncertainty, asset specificity,353
and frequency of dealings, some transactions are conducted more efficiently354
in hierarchies rather than in markets (Williamson 1979, 1985). Transaction355
costs thus determine the efficiency of different governance institutions. The356
basic insight that transaction cost economics can bring to the economics of357
blockchain is to ask the same, but now extended, question: why do (or might)358
some transactions occur in blockchains, rather than in firms or markets?359
Transaction costs are the costs of coordinating economic activities, and360
reductions in transaction costs do impact TFP measures. The mechanism of361
their effect, however, is different. Effective institutional innovations reduce362
the transaction costs of coordinating economic activities. Improvements in363
institutional orders reduce transaction costs, and drive investment in those364
economic orders, which eventually manifest as increases in economic activity per365
input unit, and so as TFP growth. In the neoclassical approach, technological366
change lowers production costs. In the new institutional approach, technological367
change lowers transaction costs.368
So the question is – which type of technological change is blockchain? Which369
type of costs – production costs or transaction costs – does it affect most signifi-370
cantly? Now, blockchain is manifestly an information technology – as a software371
protocol based on cryptography, a blockchain is a new technology for public372
databases of digital information – but blockchain is also manifestly a GPT. So at373
first sight it seems to be a productivity-enhancing technology that economises on374
production costs. Yet when we dig deeper into the nature of blockchain-based375
economising, it is often a consequence of transaction cost efficiencies.376
Blockchains are a technology for economic coordination377
With a productivity enhancing innovation, the new technology enables more to378
be done with less. The new technology should outcompete the old technology379
on some important margin. If, however, we focus on blockchains as a380
cryptocurrency and payments system, e.g. Bitcoin, on many margins it seems381
a vastly inferior technology. With the current state of the technology (with382
an average blocksize less than 1MB, and without sidechains) it is slower than383
credit card-based payments platforms such as Visa, and has a lower capacity384
channel. But new technologies are usually worse on some dimensions, and385
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their value often accrues to properties that were poor or non-existent in the386
competing technology. With cryptocurrency payments the relevant feature is the387
deep architectural change in how payments work, now entirely peer-to-peer.388
This has costs, including transactions being irreversible (although for some that389
is a powerful benefit). But the benefits relate to what is no longer required,390
namely corporate or government permissioning, monitoring and regulation of391
private finance (replaced by a crypto-wallet that can pay anyone, anywhere,392
who also has such a wallet). As such, the productivity gains come from the393
organisational efficiency gains, from stripping out layers of activity no longer394
needed because trusted third parties are not required, or can be achieved more395
efficiently using native capabilities in the blockchain technology stack, such as396
multisig protocols.10397
Distributed ledgers are a technology of decentralisation. Centralisation can398
be an efficient source of order and control at small scales, but complex self-399
organising systems tend toward decentralisation as they grow because the400
coordination costs eventually overwhelm any centralised node, causing fragility.401
Loss of centralised control is a cost, but the benefit is that decentralised systems402
are more robust. Distributed systems still require system-wide coordination,403
however; this is usually achieved through adaptation, for example through the404
price system in a market (Hayek 1945).11 Blockchains create distributed systems405
by eliminating centralisation, which was needed previously for reconciliation or406
consensus on a ledger with an alternative technology for achieving consensus407
about economic data. The implication is that by providing an alternative408
organisational mechanism to reach agreement about economic facts, which409
are used in turn to coordinate economic activity, this technology offers an410
alternative way of coordinating economic activity. Distributed ledgers are a411
technology for economic coordination that is a potential substitute for the412
economic coordination provided by markets, hierarchies, relational contracting413
and governments. Blockchains are in this sense an institutional innovation. The414
relevant margin of economic analysis is therefore not with TFP and growth, but415
rather with substitute mechanisms of economic coordination and governance.416
To unpack the relevant margins of governance efficiency that blockchains have417
over firms, markets, networks, relational contracting and governments, consider418
the underlying problem of the economics of efficient governance.419
A transactions cost explanation of the economic efficiency of blockchains420
The comparative economic efficiency of blockchains can be understood as421
a simple extension of Williamson’s (1985) operationalisation of Coase’s422
transactions cost analysis with respect to the comparative efficiency of firms423
10 An explanation of multisig protocols is available here: https://coincenter.org/entry/
what-is-multi-sig-and-what-can-it-do (accessed 30 March 2017).
11 Tokens within the blockchain can be thought of as being an ‘inbuilt’ price mechanism.
12 S I N C L A I R D A V I D S O N , P R I M A V E R A D E F I L I P P I A N D J A S O N P O T T S
versus markets. Williamson argued that a hierarchical organisation and relational424
contracting are ways to control opportunism in the presence of bounded425
rationality and asset specificity, by internalising the (transaction) costs of426
opportunism. Control of opportunism is not the only economic reason that427
firms exist (Hodgson 2004; Langlois 1995) but it is one force that allocates428
economic activity across comparative economic institutions. Blockchains can429
also control opportunism, but they do so by harnessing market mechanisms and430
internalising them within a closed and guaranteed payments system. Williamson431
(1979) argued that under common behavioural, technological and organisational432
conditions, firms minimise the transaction costs of controlling opportunism, and433
are thus efficient ways to organise economic activity. A similar claim is that434
blockchain platforms can minimise opportunism by a combination of radical435
public transparency coupled with cryptographic enforcement and execution436
through smart contracts and their agents (e.g. DAOs) (Swanson 2014).437
To the extent that opportunistic behaviour becomes searchable public438
information (overcoming bounded rationality), the private costs of opportunism439
are now higher. And to the extent that detailed contracts can be written440
and executed indefinitely inthe future, the counter-party risks associated with441
investment in specialised assets are reduced. The implication is that blockchain-442
based platforms for coordinating economic activity may compete effectively443
with hierarchies (which exploit incomplete contracts to overcome opportunism)444
and relational contracting (which requires trust between parties, and exploits445
the expectation of repeated exchanges) on some important margins. Where446
blockchains can mitigate opportunism through crypto-economic incentives and447
mechanisms at a relatively low transaction cost they will be more efficient448
(i.e. transaction-cost minimising) institutions for coordinating economic activity449
compared to organisational hierarchies and relational contracts (which are in450
turn, à la Williamson, more efficient than markets).451
A possible counterargument is that while firms are made of incomplete452
contracts (Hart 1989), blockchain-based smart contracts and DAOs are by453
construction a domain of complete contracts (Wright and De Filippi 2015).12454
This sharpens the distinction between blockchains, firms, relational contracts455
and markets. In the Coasian view, a firm is a ‘nexus of contracts’, but456
specifically a nexus of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore 1990: Jensen and457
Meckling 1976; Williamson 1985). In a world with zero transaction costs, all458
contracts would be complete and all economic coordination would be through459
market transactions. Incomplete contracting models (Tirole 1999) usually invoke460
12 Abramowicz (2016: 362) observes that ‘cryptocurrencies cannot solve the problem of incomplete
contracts, and as long as contracts are incomplete, humans will need to resolve ambiguities’. Yet building
on Wright and De Filippi’s (2015) approach to ‘Lex Cryptographica’, Abramowicz proposes a model of
peer-to-peer law in which cryptocurrency protocols incentivise collective human judgment both to make
law and to resolve disputes with incomplete contracts.
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transaction costs arising from: (1) uncertainty, or unforeseen contingencies,461
as information problems; (2) the costs of writing contracts; (3) the costs of462
enforcing contracts. The implication is that blockchains may not compete head-463
to-head with firms, but rather may carve out those parts of firms that can be464
rendered as complete contracts where they lower transaction costs on any of465
these three margins. For instance, blockchain-enabled smart contract-facilitated466
transactions should in principle experience fewer efficiency problems due to467
information asymmetries – adverse selection (prior to a transaction) and moral468
hazard (following a transaction). Smart contracts could also be effective ways to469
load significant numbers of low-probability state contingencies into contracts.470
These could function like open-source libraries able to be inserted into machine-471
readable contracts, reducing the complexity cost of writing large state-contingent472
contracts, and so lowering transaction costs. Both ex ante contractual discovery473
and ex post contractual renegotiation costs (i.e. bargaining and haggling costs)474
are an expected consequence of incomplete contracts. Such contracts have475
dynamic benefits, enabling adaptation, but in the shadow of these expected476
but uncertain costs all parties will contract less than is optimal. Blockchains477
potentially enable the known parts of these relationships to be carved out478
efficiently from the unknown parts, and executed automatically based upon state479
conditionals, increasing the range to which economic coordination can extend480
into the future.481
In new institutional economic analysis, organisational form is shaped by the482
need to control opportunism (Williamson 1985: 64–7). The proximate cause483
of opportunism is the conjoint pay-offs to idiosyncratic investment – i.e. asset484
specificity, a normal part of all economic production requiring the coordination485
of joint inputs. But the ultimate cause of opportunism is the intent and ability486
of agents to exploit trust. Williamson calls this ‘self-interest seeking with guile’,487
and emphasises the connection with bounded rationality. With full rationality,488
complete information and costless transactions, all agents can comprehensively489
contract with no need for trust. But with bounded rationality (i.e. imperfect490
information and costly transactions) the economic margin of contracting is491
trust – i.e. contract up to the point where the marginal cost of supplying492
trust (accumulating agent-specific experience, monitoring reputation) equals the493
marginal benefit of that trust (the surplus, compared to the next best institutional494
alternative). In this view, blockchains are an additional mechanism for495
controlling opportunism, eliminating the need for trust by using crypto-enforced496
execution of contracts through consensus and transparency. Opportunism is497
significantly reduced in DAOs compared to in-the-world Williamsonian firms. As498
Catalini and Gans (2016) emphasise in their claims that blockchain technology499
lowers verification costs, the lowered costs of opportunism also extend the500
domain of the market and shrink the domain of organisations. So, if the501
Williamson model of firms and markets is correct that economic activity and502
investment is stymied by threats and engagement of opportunism, blockchains503
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are an institutional innovation. If governance exists for reasons other than504
opportunism, however, then distributed ledger technologies may well be a source505
of productivity growth, but not the institutional revolution argued here.506
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggest another possible avenue whereby a507
blockchain governance revolution may unfold at the margin of the economic508
efficiency of organisations versus markets. They proposed an alternative509
transaction costs theory of the firm that emphasised monitoring costs in team510
production. When production is more efficient with shared inputs than non-511
shared ones, it may be more efficient to establish sets of agreements that512
characterise firms as the team use of inputs plus the centralised position of513
some party in the contractual arrangements of all other inputs, than to govern514
these transactions using markets. The Alchian and Demsetz model argues for515
the efficiency of centralised monitoring. What blockchains introduce, however,516
is a new prospect of distributed monitoring, undermining the main argument for517
the comparative efficiency of the firm in the context of the generalised efficiency518
of production with shared inputs. In essence the blockchain is not simply a519
trustless technology, it is a self-monitoring technology too. To illustrate this520
point consider Alchian’s (1983) definition of a firm:13521
A firm is a (1) coalition of interspecific resources, some of which are owned in522
common (2), and some of which are compensated according to some criteria523
other than separably additive outputs and other than by directly measured524
marginal productivity (3) of saleable products.525
For Alchian (1983) asset specificity and quasi-rents are the defining features of526
the firm. The firm has to own specific assets to prevent ex post opportunistic527
expropriation. This necessitates a non-market-related monitoring and reward528
system within the firm. The blockchain, however, has the potential to resolve, or529
at least largely ameliorate, those issues. For example, Bitcoin relies on a proof-of-530
work algorithm that is analogous to the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) monitoring531
problem: has task A been performed or not? While this is a valuable function, it532
is possible to extend the principle.533
For example, Backfeed,14 a social protocol that builds upon blockchain-534
based infrastructure and the smart-contract platform provided by Ethereum,535
implements an alternative and more generic consensus algorithm called proof-of-536
value that relies on human evaluation to discover the value of every contribution537
as perceived according to the distinctive value system of each individual538
network. Steem,15 a blockchain-based social media organisation, performs a539
similar function though community-voting using its native cryptocurrency.540
Individual members of a community or organisation evaluate the contributions541
13 This paper is an extension and partial correction to the earlier Alchian and Demsetz (1972) paper.
14 See http://backfeed.cc/
15 See https://steem.io/.
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of others, who will be rewarded (according to the value they bring to the542
community) with economic tokens (transferable) and a reputation score (non-543
transferable) that indicates the influence they hold within the organisation.16544
The Backfeed protocol that substitutes for monitoring deploys a market-like545
mechanism (reputation and price) to allow for the collaborative creation and546
distribution of value in peer networks. The system relies on a specific protocol to547
enable distributed peer networks to contribute to an organisation. Through the548
blockchain-based Backfeed protocol they can coordinate themselves indirectly,549
mutually exploiting their specialised knowledge (à la Hayek 1945). A peer-to-550
peer evaluation system determines the perceived value of each contribution in a551
decentralised fashion in order to allocate influence and rewards accordingly.552
Backfeed is an experimental protocol that is itself built on an experimental553
platform – Ethereum – and Steem is a proof-of-concept social media platform.554
They may or may not succeed. They are interesting, however, because they appear555
to be a new type of economic institution. These blockchain protocols enable556
a decentralised reputation system to distribute authority among community557
members dynamically in order to organise individuals organically into a558
meritocracy with a decentralised topology. The values of every individual559
that partake in the organisation, weighted according to the influence they560
each hold within that organisation, constitute – in aggregate – the overall561
value system of the organisation. As the dynamics of the organisation evolve,562
with new contributors coming and old contributors leaving, the influence of563
every individual will change, and so ultimately will the value system of that564
organisation. The blockchain-based Backfeed protocol has firm-like, market-like565
and government-like properties, yet is a distinct form of economic governance.566
The Williamson model of the firm (opportunism) and the Alchian and Demsetz567
model of the firm (monitoring) both provide theoretical reasons to expect that568
blockchain technology may erode the margin of the comparative efficiency of569
firms. Catalini and Gans (2016) make a similar point, indicating that blockchain570
shifts the margin of institutional efficiency toward markets. The point we have571
made in this paper is that all of these theoretical arguments can be sound, but572
that the Williamson, Alchian and Demsetz, or the Gans and Catalini predictions573
about the shifted boundaries of firms and markets may not follow because they574
failed to consider a further option: namely that the dynamic at work is not a575
reallocation of economic activity across a given set of institutions – markets,576
hierarchies, relational contracting – but rather the mass adoption of this new577
technology may lead to an evolution of the economic institutions of capitalism578
itself.579
16 The reputation score in the Backfeed protocol can increase in two ways: (1) by making a
contribution that is perceived as valuable by the community; and (2) by making a useful evaluation
of someone else’s contribution. Hence, individuals are judged not only by their actions (or contributions),
but also by their judgment (or evaluations) of the actions of others.
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4. Blockchains and institutional economic evolution580
Blockchain-based distributed ledger technology adds an additional category581
to the suite of Williamson’s (1985) ‘economic institutions of capitalism’ –582
viz. markets, hierarchies and relational contracting – with a new type of583
economic order: a decentralised collaborative organisation (DCO).17 A DCO is584
a self-governing organisation with the coordination properties of a market, the585
governance properties of a commons and the constitutional, legal and monetary586
properties of a nation state. It is an organisation, but it is not hierarchical. It587
has the coordination properties of a market through the token systems that588
coordinate distributed action, but it is not a market because the predominant589
activity is production, not exchange. And it has the unanimous constitutional590
properties of a rule-of-law governed nation state, by complicit agreement of591
all ‘citizens’ who opt in to such a decentralised collaborative organisation,592
and the automatic execution of the rules of that DCO through smart contract593
enforcement (Atzori 2015).18594
The central argument of this paper has been that much of the extant hype595
around blockchain as a new digital technology that will drive productivity596
growth – just as previous generations of ICT have done – actually misrepresents597
its nature as a technology. We have argued that the interesting thing about598
blockchain is that it is an institutional innovation. From this perspective, its599
significance is as an evolutionary development in the institutions of market600
capitalism (Hodgson 2015). An economy with blockchain technology is601
institutionally more varied and complex than an economy without it. From an602
analytic perspective, the relevant question is the margin upon which blockchain603
institutions compete with alternative modes of economic coordination – markets,604
hierarchies and relational contracting (Williamson 1979, 1991), as well as605
clubs, commons and government (North 1990; Ostrom 1990, 2005). We have606
suggested that transaction costs provide a lens through which to understand607
the comparative institutional advantage of blockchains and the co-evolutionary608
dynamics with other institutions of market capitalism.609
One path by which the institutions of market capitalism may adapt to610
blockchain technologies is through the substitution of economic governance from611
firms, markets, and relational contracts with blockchains. The same economic612
activity is institutionally reallocated. Currency transactions or settlement of613
financial trades move ‘to the blockchain’ for instance. But another path is that614
blockchains-based coordination may enable new types of economic activity that615
were previously not able to be governed by firms, markets or governments616
because the transaction costs were too high to justify the expected benefits.617
17 See Ostrom (2005) and Stringham (2015) on the evolution of private or community-level rule-
governed economic orders.
18 Reijers et al. (2016) argue that blockchain governance is a special type of social contract mechanism,
and thereby suffers the same basic problems that are invariably resolved through political action.
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In this case, a more institutionally varied economy (now containing blockchain618
coordination) can support new types of economic activity. In this instance the619
economy becomes more institutionally and economically complex. The Ethereum620
blockchain-based examples of Backfeed and Steem discussed above illustrate621
this, bringing economic coordination and governance institutions to spaces that622
currently are either served poorly or served not at all by extant coordination623
mechanisms of markets, hierarchies and governments. In other words, the impact624
of blockchain technology may be less to improve the efficiency of existing625
economic orders (for example dis-intermediating payments and finance) than626
to expand the scope and depth of economic governance through the evolution627
of new types of coordinating institutions that are native to blockchains.628
The evolutionary character of modern institutional economic analysis is629
Veblenian and Darwinian (Hodgson 1998; Hodgson and Knudsen 2010) or630
game theoretic (Schotter 2008). What it is not, generally, is Schumpeterian, for631
the simple reason that institutions are understood as coordinating rules, rather632
than as disruptive new technologies. But what is interesting about blockchain633
technology is that the current mix of hype and scepticism about its status634
as a new information technology or general purpose technology (GPT) has635
largely overlooked a further possibility: viz. that it is an institutional technology.636
New technologies of governance are relatively rare but it is important to637
identify them because unlike most GPTs, where the main dynamic effect is638
diffuse productivity gains, an institutional technology introduces a new mode639
of economic coordination and governance. We have argued in this paper that640
blockchain technology, while just one of a many Schumpeterian technologies641
driving economic evolution, ought nevertheless to be of particular interest to642
institutional economists, whether from a transaction costs perspective in seeking643
to understand the boundaries of firms and markets, or from the perspective of644
the evolution of economic institutions.645
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